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Abstract 
 
  The Coyne Affair is the greatest institutional crisis faced by the Bank of Canada in its 
history. The crisis took place in 1959-1961 and led to the resignation of the Governor, once he 
was cleared of any wrongdoing. The crisis eventually resulted in a major reform of the Bank of 
Canada Act. The paper highlights the critical role played by the directive in central banking 
legislation. Archival and empirical evidence is used to assess the performance of monetary 
policy throughout the 1950s. In doing so, a real-time dataset is constructed for both Canada and 
the US that permit estimation of reaction functions. I find that the case against James Coyne is 








Pierre L. Siklos, Wilfrid Laurier University 
e-mail: psiklos@wlu.ca 
Home Page: www.wlu.ca/sbe/psiklos 
Phone: (519) 884-0710, ext. 2491 
Fax: (519) 884-5922 
 
JEL Classification Codes: N100, E52, E58, C52 
 
Keywords: Coyne Affair, monetary policy stance, Taylor rules, real-time data. 
   1
1.   Introduction 
The Coyne Affair arguably represents the greatest institutional crisis ever faced by the 
Bank of Canada. The conflict between the then Governor, James E. Coyne, and the Conservative 
government led by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, took place less than 25 years into the 
Bank’s existence. In spite of warnings from academics and policymakers that the responsibilities 
of the Bank of Canada were poorly defined, the prevailing view was that “if it ain’t broke, don’t 
fix it.” Adding to the tension was the fact that, virtually alone in the industrial world, Canada 
chose to return to a floating exchange rate precisely because policymakers firmly believed that 
an independent monetary policy was in the nation’s best interests. Having done so, officials in 
government lost sight of the fact that the position of a central bank under a float matters whereas, 
under a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank can no longer be independent, in this case 
from US monetary policy. 
Arguably, a conflict between the government and the central bank was perhaps 
inevitable, even if observers at the time were somewhat dismissive of the likelihood of such an 
occurrence. First, in defiance of the international community, the Government permitted the 
Canadian dollar to float freely in the very early days of the Bretton Woods system. Second, 
having opted for a made-in-Canada monetary policy, the Bank then allowed the stance of 
monetary policy to be dictated by the behavior of short-term interest rates. This may have been a 
first in the industrial world. In retrospect, inexperience with this type of monetary policy 
strategy, combined with a peculiar communication policy, created a ‘perfect storm’ that erupted 
as the decade of the 1950s ended. While the story of the Coyne Affair is partly one of a clash of 
personalities between the Governor and the Minister of Finance, Donald Fleming, this paper tries 
to eschew this angle and focuses instead on how monetary policy was carried out and explained 
in public.
1 The paper also considers of the academic debate that raged in Canada at the time. The 
resulting debate was not relegated only to scholarly journals but it was also played out in public. 
Drawing on material from the Bank of Canada’s Archives, as well as other sources, I 
conclude that the case against James Coyne is ‘not proven’. The paper then considers whether 
                                                 
1 Mittra (1977) offers an historical account of select conflicts between the Treasury and the central bank, including 
the one between Coyne and the Government. It is easy to fall into the trap of believing that there was inadequate 
understanding og how monetary policy might function under a floating exchange rate regime. Between 1914 and 
1939, for example, Canada’s exchange rate was flexible and policymakers during the late 1940 and early 1950s felt 
that, overall, the ex[erience was a good one. See, for example, Siklos (2007), Powell (1999), and Cornell (1952-
1955).   2
any empirical evidence can be marshaled for or against the Bank of Canada’s policies throughout 
Coyne’s tenure as Governor. I construct a real-time data set for the US and Canada and find that, 
while the stance of monetary policy was appropriate most of the time, there are two periods 
during the late 1950s when the Bank’s reaction to output and inflation development cannot be 
properly explained. The paper concludes with a discussion of general lessons learned from the 
Coyne Affair for other central banks. 
  In essence, this paper represents a case study of the political economy of 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, the lessons learned have broader implications for the role of 
central bank transparency and accountability, and the importance of matching institutional design 
with the requirements of the monetary policy regime the central bank is expected to function 
under. 
2.   Monetary Policy at the Bank of Canada, 1954-61 
  As the 1950s began there was tremendous optimism about the role and potential 
importance of monetary policy, in both the U.S. and in Canada. Arthur Burns, who would 
become Chair of the FOMC during the sixties, argued in 1954 that “the government must use 
monetary policy in a flexible manner and assign it a very high priority in the arsenal of contra-
cyclical weapons” (as quoted in Bremner (2004), p. 110). Exuberance about the promise of 
monetary policy was also reflected in the popular press. The New York Times, citing Burns, 
commented that “If government policy proceeds on these premises, we will avoid in the future 
the depressions that have marred the brilliant record of free enterprise in the past” (as quoted in 
Bremner (2004), p. 110).  
Figures 1 and 2 help set the stage for understanding the Bank of Canada’s assessment 
about overall economic conditions and its changing views about the stance of monetary policy. A 
central element in the story of the Coyne Affair requires contrasting monetary policy in Canada 
vis-à-vis that of the U.S. Hence, comparable U.S. data are also plotted. As is clear from these 
figures, inflation and unemployment rates are remarkably similar in both countries over the 
period considered. Also shown in the bottom Figure are the shaded areas indicating NBER 
recession dates. While these are, strictly speaking, applicable to U.S. data only, as we shall see 
below, Bank of Canada commentary suggests that U.S. and Canadian business cycles were 
roughly in phase throughout much of the 1950s. Indeed, the striking similarities in US and   3
Canadian business cycles in spite of a flexible exchange rate regime, is one of the puzzles that 
has yet to be fully explained.
2 
Turning to some indicators of monetary policy shown in Figure 2, we see rather dramatic 
differences between Fed and Bank of Canada policies. Following Goodfriend (1993), I rely on 
short-term and long-term interest rate indicators to evaluate the stance and credibility of 
monetary policy in Canada. Changes in long-term interest rates are assumed to reflect changes in 
expectations of inflation. Sustained increases in long-term interest rates signal an “inflation 
scare”, a topic much discussed – using different language – in successive Bank of Canada 
Annual Reports to be discussed below. However, unlike the Fed, which responded to the threat 
of higher inflation in measured steps, and reversed course quickly once the inflation scare 
passed,
3 the Bank of Canada responded aggressively both to larger and smaller increases in long-
term rates in almost equal measure. Figure 2, therefore, nicely encapsulates both the differences 
between U.S. and Canadian monetary policies, as well as hinting at the brewing conflict between 
the federal government and the Bank of Canada. Canadian short-term interest rates are 
considerably more volatile than in the US while the failure of long-term rates in Canada to fall 
after 1958, in spite of a fall in inflation, suggests perhaps a lack of credibility in monetary policy. 
In contrast, over the same period, long-term interest rates fall in the US.  
A second factor undoubtedly was Canada’s decision to abandon the Bretton Woods 
system in late 1950 (Powell 1999, p. 61), a mere five years after the creation of the post-war 
exchange rate system. The Canadian dollar had previously been devalued from par with the U.S. 
dollar to 90.9¢ in 1949. The Bank feared that the currency was undervalued, partly as a result of 
a then secret memorandum prepared in 1949 by Coyne himself who advocated a moving peg “… 
which could move up or down from time to time as economic conditions might require” (Coyne 
1949).
4 The rise in commodity prices combined to put upward pressure on the Canadian dollar 
assisted by strong inflows of capital. In a letter to then Governor Graham Towers the Minister of 
Finance, D.C. Abbott, informed the Bank of the government’s decision “…not to maintain a 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Bordo, Dib and Schenbru (2006), and Siklos (2007), and references therein. 
3 An instructive account of the measured response of the US Fed during the first half of the 1950s especially, can be 
found in McChesney Martin (1957). 
4 Coyne also considered maintaining the peg but wanted preferred a much wider fluctuation band than the ±1% 
permitted under Bretton Woods. This plan was thought to be less desirable both because the current peg need not 
necessarily be an equilibrium one as well as because no one knew how wide the band ought to be. It is arguable 
whether Bretton Woods was fully in place prior to 1959, when current account convertibility was established in the 
industrial world.   4
fixed rate of exchange…” (Rasminsky 1946-1951). Figure 3 shows the evolution of the nominal 
exchange rate against the U.S. dollar before, during, and shortly after re-entry into the Bretton 
Woods arrangement in May 1962. The divergence between the official and free market exchange 
rates prior to 1950 is apparent and helps explain the attraction of liberating the exchange rate 
from its peg. Freed from the peg domestic monetary policy was able to set an independent 
course, a point well understood by policy makers.
5 Nevertheless, while monetary conditions 
would continue to be assessed via developments in the money supply, James Coyne’s accession 
to the Governorship would lead to the introduction of an interest rate instrument. There was also 
an understanding of the connection between exchange rate changes and inflation, on the one 
hand, and inflation and interest rates on the other. Indeed, Bank of Canada estimates of the pass-
through effects suggest that a roughly 6% change in the exchange rate lead to a 1% change in the 
CPI (Johnstone 1958). These features of the conduct of monetary policy were further 
underscored by the decision, beginning November 1956, to allow the bank rate to float with the 
three month yield in Treasury bills, by maintaining a one-quarter of one percent differential 
between the two instruments.  
Figure 4 plots four different measures of the output gap, a modern equivalent of the 
capacity utilization concept that would have been referred to in descriptions of general economic 
developments in successive Annual Reports of the Bank of Canada. Other than perhaps the linear 
trend case (LT), the remaining proxies, namely the Blanchard-Quah (BQ) decomposition (see 
Blanchard and Quah 1989), the nowadays widely-used Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and 
quadratic trend (QT) cases would not have been widely used, or known, in the 1950s. The lines 
labelled _RT refer to data that are based on the January 1972 vintage, while the lines labelled 
_FL in the bottom portion of Figure 4 refer to data based on the April 2003 vintage.
6  It is 
apparent from both Figures that revisions can be substantial partly due to changing definitions of 
the variables of interest (e.g., from GNP or GNE to GDP, fixed-weights through chain-weights). 
Virtually all “real time” data reveal a boom from 1955 to 1957, with the exception of the BQ 
filter. The same boom is less evident based on the final data. Indeed, the linear trend shows 
excess capacity in the economy through the entire 1950s, except briefly in 1956. However, as 
                                                 
5 This is not a view shared by everyone. Bordo, Dib, and Schembri (2006) use counterfactual experiments to show 
that Canada’s experience with floating rates in the 1950s was not an unqualified success. Siklos (2007) considers 
whether the puzzling stability of the Canadian dollar throughout much of the 1950s experiment with floating 
exchange rates was due to the intervention activities of the Bank of Canada which amounted to a ‘fear of floating’. 
6 The construction and sources for the ‘real-time’ data are detailed in section 5 below.   5
pointed out above, even these data are considerably revised relative to those that policy makers, 
and academics, could have seen during the 1950s. To illustrate, Figure 5 plots output gaps based 
on the LT, QT, and HP filters for the 1957Q4 vintage that roughly corresponds to the vintage of 
data that would have been used to prepare the Bank of Canada’s 1957 Annual Report while the 
1960Q2 vintage would describe economic activity around the time of Coyne’s departure from 
the Bank. These data tell an altogether different story. The 1957 vintage is roughly similar to the 
quasi real time estimates shown in Figure 4 although the recession in 1954 would have appeared 
deeper to policy makers than if data revised and corrected by the early 1970s had been available 
to them. The same is true of the boom that was experienced in the early 1950s. By 1960, the 
picture looked different again, with the boom of 1956 considerably stronger than was apparent 
just three years earlier while the recession of 1958-59 was perhaps not as deep as might have 
appeared at first, depending on the chosen filter. Subsequent revisions (see Figure 5) would 
suggest a considerably deeper recession than was evident from the data at the time it would have 
been available to policy makers. What is perhaps most striking about all these figures, but 
especially from the data for the 1960Q2 vintage, are the large swings away from potential output. 
It is conceivable that it is the volatility of output movements during this period that was at the 
root cause of dissatisfaction with Bank of Canada policies.
7 
The Bank of Canada’s Annual Report was an important vehicle used by the central bank 
to explain its policy actions. According to the version of the Bank of Canada Act in force at the 
time (section 27; see Aufricht 1967, vol. 2), the Bank was only required to provide financial 
accounts. There was no requirement to include a discussion or an assessment of the conduct of 
monetary policy. Coyne, however, began to rely on the Annual Reports as an important 
communications device.   
As 1957 began inflation was the principal preoccupation of the Bank. At the same time, 
however, the 1957 Annual Report devotes considerable space to the limits of monetary policy. 
While recognizing that monetary policy ought to avoid conditions in which there are sharp spurts 
in inflation, the Report states that “…, the objective of monetary policy should be – and is – to 
encourage and assist an increase in economic activity” (Bank of Canada 1958, p. 23). Elsewhere, 
                                                 
7 Critics would not fund much comfort in the behaviour is the US output gap. Based on the earliest vintage of data 
available (February 1966), the output gap is as large and as volatile as in the Canadian case (not shown), as well as 
being largely coincident. Data for the US is from the real time data base of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
(www.phi.frb.org/econ/forecast./reaindex.html).    6
the Report suggests that, in spite of the “… added flexibility which a free exchange rate 
provides” (op. cit., p. 17-18), there are substantial limitations to the insulating properties of the 
exchange rate system. It is worth pointing out again that Coyne was one of the architects of the 
adoption of a floating exchange rate (Powell 1999, p. 62). 
The 1958 Annual Report states the Bank’s objective in a rather different tone. Whereas 
the compatibility of price stability with economic growth is highlighted, the language is more 
precise. Coyne sees the Bank’s essential role as “… regulating the rate of change in overall 
monetary supply in such a manner as is consistent with and, so far as monetary actions can, will 
contribute to sound and sustained economic growth under stable prices” (Bank of Canada 1959, 
p. 9). The year 1958 is also significant as it marks the start of the Federal government’s 
Conversion Loan Program when short-term wartime Victory Loan bonds were to be exchanged 
for longer-term government bonds.
8 As always, economic developments in the United States 
loomed large and, once again, the Bank warned of the dangers of higher expectations of 
inflation. Nevertheless, the Governor labeled such fears as “exaggerated” (op. cit., p. 3). 
The 1959 Annual Report sees a significant, if not dramatic, change in tone. The Report 
begins by quoting the Bank of Canada Act of 1934 to underline both the importance of stable 
prices and the inability of the central bank to shoulder the entire burden for economic 
management. “Above all, I am concerned … in the thought that there is in monetary 
management some magical power or hidden hand which will relieve us of the necessity of 
remedying our situation by our own exertions, by not consuming more than we produce, and by 
prudent management of our collective affairs” (op. cit., p. 10). 
We read for the first time a warning by Governor Coyne over the deleterious 
consequences of government deficits and the negative economic consequences of “…excessive 
overall spending…” reflected in “…huge deficits in our international balance of payments on 
current accounts” (op. cit., p. 7). Several passages of the Annual Report hammer away at the 
potential for loose fiscal policy to threaten growth and stability in the Canadian economy. 
The 1960 Annual Report represents a plea to the public to understand the limits of 
monetary policy. Written in 1959, when the recession in Canada was largely blamed on Bank of 
Canada policies, Coyne asserts that central banking is not about achieving price stability at the 
                                                 
8 The average maturity was thereby lengthened from 6 years and 2 months to 10 years and 7 months. See Bank of 
Canada (1959, p. 27).   7
expense of economic growth. He goes over the heads of the politicians – by now what would 
eventually be called the Coyne Affair is in full swing – and pleads to the public that “…emphasis 
which is placed from time to time on the limitations of monetary management by those who are 
engaged in central banking is based on concern over the healthy vigor of the economy, it is not a 
sign of an uncooperative spirit or a desire to create difficulties” (Bank of Canada 1961, p. 23). 
Indeed, consistent with the spirit of the Bank of Canada Act, Coyne declares that the “…goals of 
full employment, sustained economic growth, stable prices, and a sound currency, must all be 
pursued simultaneously. It should not be necessary – were it not for rather extreme statements 
that have appeared in some public discussions of these matters – to remark that the Bank of 
Canada is not in any way opposed to the idea of full employment, and does not operate with a 
view to restricting economic growth or preventing increased employment in the supposed 
interests of monetary policy or of anti-inflation endeavours” (Bank of Canada 1961, p. 16). 
In Coyne’s view, culprits for the woes facing the Canadian economy are the current 
account deficit and insufficient investment (Bank of Canada 1961, pp. 14-15). He continues to 
blame inappropriate fiscal policy for making matters worse though the tone is far less bellicose 
than in the 1959 Annual Report.  
One can surmise from the foregoing quotes that the Bank is under attack by the 
government over poor economic growth, high unemployment and interest rates. The Bank’s 
reactions are unprecedented and rather unusual from the central banking perspective. Only some 
of the comments by various finance ministers in the euro area in recent years, and the ECB’s 
reaction to them, come close to the tone used in the Bank of Canada’s Annual Report. There are, 
of course, some rather important differences between the events in Canada in the late 1950s and 
those in the euro area in the first years of the 21
st century. While Coyne was responsible for 
monetary policy in Canada before the full impact of Phillips’ (1958) paper led some academics 
to begin thinking that economic management was a simple matter of picking the appropriate 
point on a Phillips curve, there were plenty of references in internal Bank of Canada memoranda 
that explicitly questioned belief that any such trade-off existed.
9 In contrast, nowadays, we live 
with an understanding of the inconsistency of optimal plans due to Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
Second, the ECB operates as a statutorily autonomous institution. The implications of the lack of 
                                                 
9 Nor is this a phenomenon restricted to Canada. McChesney Martin (1957, p.1) is also emphatic on this point. “I 
refuse to adopt the defeatist position that inflation is the alternative to unemployment.   8
formal central bank autonomy, combined with a sense that monetary policy cannot cure all 
economic ills, is most cogently reflected in Coyne’s day with the statement: “central bankers 
throughout the world have come to expect far too much of monetary manipulation both in 
counteracting strong inflationary forces and promoting sound economic growth and overcoming 
recession” (Bank of Canada 1961, p. 23).  
3.   The Art of Monetary Policy in the 1950s 
  To fix ideas, and partly to conserve space, the discussion that follows will focus on a few 
of the key academic actors intimately involved in the debate that led up to, and followed, the 
Coyne affair. They are: H. Scott Gordon, David Smith, and David Slater. 
It is immediately apparent to someone revisiting the academic literature of the 1950s that 
econometric investigations were nascent and that modeling strategies were far outstripping the 
capacity of existing computing technology to handle the estimation of even relatively small 
systems of equations, not to mention the paucity of data to input into such models. Thus, for 
example, Brown (1954), who develops a system of equations containing endogenous variables, 
points out that using such a model to generate forecasts, even under relatively restrictive 
statistical assumptions, imply “…a considerable amount of computation, but will be much more 
practicable when electronic computers are more widely available.” (op.cit., p.190) Therefore, 
many of the criticisms of Bank of Canada policy, and analyses of monetary policy more 
generally, are either descriptive or are couched in relatively simple Keynesian models, at least by 
today’s standards. The latter describes quite well the approach taken by Smith (1960) who was 
concerned with predictions of a model extended to cover the open economy and, in particular, 
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies.
10 Smith and Slater (1961) criticized Bank of 
Canada policy for not being sufficiently expansionary and in its overemphasis on inflation 
control. However, Smith’s (1960) work, and that of other contemporaries (see below), saw the 
monetary authority as being completely subordinate to the fiscal authority, or unequipped to 
carry out stabilization policies. “I feel that in most cases, however, even the most vigorous use of 
monetary-fiscal policy will not provide an independent growth rate in an open economy.” (Smith 
1960, p. 631) Indeed, Smith points out that his simple Keynesian model suggests that an 
independent monetary authority (i.e., one that acts “alone”) would be required to tighten 
                                                 
10 The same concerns, but with an emphasis on the role of the exchange rate regime, would be the centrepiece of 
what came to be called Mundell-Fleming model (Mundell 1960).   9
monetary policy to eliminate excess demand in the economy. The source of the dilemma is 
apparently that other policy instruments, namely fiscal instruments, are not being considered. 
Hence, the core criticism is based on the presumption that the Bank, and the fiscal authorities, 
should act as a single entity appropriately coordinating and calibrating their policies.
11 This 
criticism hardly seems unreasonable, from either today’s perspective, nor from the perspective of 
the 1950s when, as noted earlier, central banks and Finance Ministers emphasized how the two 
agencies acted, or at least desired to act, in unison.
12  It is comparatively much more difficult to 
isolate the precise sources of Scott Gordon’s views about the failures of the Bank of Canada to 
deliver the right monetary policy. Gordon and Read (1958) is mainly a plea for greater 
transparency and clarity in the communication of monetary policy, while defending the actions 
taken by the Bank on 1956 and 1957. The authors complain of the Bank’s supposedly loose 
language, namely equating the terms “loose” and “sound” monetary policies. Nevertheless, the 
same paper goes on to describe monetary policy as being “…extremely tight” by the middle of 
1957 (op.cit., p. 479) without providing an explanation themselves of how the degree of ease or 
tightness in policy ought to measured. Their plea for greater transparency and clarity, if desirable 
and welcome from a contemporary perspective, is, nevertheless, firmly rooted in the notion that 
the monetary and fiscal authorities ought to act as one and that the Bank of Canada’s position, 
which they describe as anomalous (op.cit., p. 465) would be tolerable if there were more 
Parliamentary oversight.
13 Indeed, in a subsequent review of the philosophical writings of Rawls, 
Buchanan, and others, Gordon (1976, p. 588) suggests that it is pointless to make clear rules to 
govern the behavior of the state. Hence, Gordon would probably take issue with proposals of the 
kind made by Buchanan (1962) and others, such as Friedman, for clearly defined constitutional 
limits on the central bank, while sharing the desiderata of transparency.
14 Others, such as Timlin 
(1953), and Deutsch (1957), were deeply concerned about the constitutional position, or lack of a 
                                                 
11 Smith (1960) points to the Bank of Canada’s 1957 Annual Report to indirectly criticize the Bank for suggesting 
that the only remedy to eliminating excess demand in the economy was through higher interest rates.  
12 See, for example, Clark (1953), then Deputy-Minister of Finance, who is effusive about how well fiscal and  
monetary policies appeared to be working together at the time. 
13 Smith (1960), p. 630, n.8) certainly had no difficulty confusing the words “sound” and “tight”, while the 
possibility that the central bank should act independently of the fiscal authorities is not even contemplated, as the 
opening pages of Gordon and Read (1958, especially p. 468) make clear. Also, see Gordon (1961, p. 16). 
14 In view of the subsequent debate between rules versus discretion in the area of monetary policy, it is useful to 
quote from Buchanan (1962, p. 166): “I should opt squarely in favor of some pre-determined, quasi-constitutional 
“rule” that would define precisely the task of the monetary authority,... This system would, ideally, produce 
divergencies between observed and predicted values for money only as a result of errors and miscalculations 
stemming from the attempts of the authorities to follow the predetermined rules.”   10
proper one, of the Bank of Canada. Deutsch (1957), writing before the Coyne Affair, paints at 
once a picture that highlights the lack of clarity in the relationship between the Bank of Canada 
and the Treasury but argues that there are mechanisms in place to ensure that all will be well. 
This seems like a perfectly good illustration of the fallacy of the argument that “if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it”. Nevertheless, some of Deutsch’s arguments are both prescient as well as a call for 
constitutional clarity. “One cannot get much enlightenment on this subject by an examination of 
the formal relationships between the Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada. For one 
thing, in Canada we have not had the opportunities for education which have arisen elsewhere 
out of wide-open controversies and public dispute. On this score there has been much sweetness 
and very little light. … it is clear that, in case of a serious and basic difference of opinion, a 
government could force the resignation of the governor. Such a step, however, would be a grave 
matter before public opinion. … Consequently, it may be expected that consultation between 
Treasury and the Bank is continuous and close. Proposals for important changes in monetary 
policy are thoroughly discussed between the two authorities, but in the end the responsibility for 
decision and action in the field of monetary policy rests with the Bank. In other words, there is 
administrative provision for the close co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policies, but at the 
same time there is a division of responsibilities and a strong shield against interference in 
monetary matters.” (Deutsch 1957, p. 220-1) Timlin (1953), writing shortly after the 1951 
Treasury-Fed Accord came into effect, is pessimistic about Canada following the U.S. in 
granting autonomy to the Bank of Canada, partly for constitutional reasons, and partly because 
the governing philosophy of the day, as was previously noted, gave monetary policy a secondary 
role in economic policy.
15 
Regardless of the side one takes on the question of the role of the central bank, it is 
apparent that, while the current view that monetary policy is best conducted in a transparent and 
                                                 
15 It is worth quoting Timlin  (1953, p. 52) at length to illustrate the importance she undoubtedly placed on a proper 
constitutional role for the Bank of Canada: “I have toyed with the vision of the Canadian dollar in the role of Eliza 
crossing the ice, I have also toyed with the vision of the Bank of Canada in the role of the honoured Victorian wife, 
revered alike for her ability to carry out the behests of her spouse, the Department of Finance, her capacity to 
produce comparative serenity in the midst of great familial urgencies, and for her sagacity in the sdvice she gives he 
lord – advice which she is  free to accept or ignore. I should like to make a modern woman of her, but there are 
limitations on the possibilities in that direction. The Douglas and Patman subcommittees of the Joint Committee on 
the Economic Report to Congress have made certain suggestions for the enhancement of the position of the Federal 
Reserve in relation to the United States Treasury. But in Canada, the high degree of concentration in the commercial 
banking, the political temper of the Canadian people, and the nature of the Canadian constitution make impossible, 
if not intolerable, the adoption of suggestions of the same type with respect to the position of the Bank of Canada.”   11
clear manner is now the accepted norm, this desideratum is not a novel one. Neufeld (1958) 
offers an excellent illustration of the lack of clarity in the oft-cited 1957 Bank of Canada Annual 
Report, when he criticizes the Report for failing to clearly explain why financial markets could 
not “digest” sufficiently tight monetary policy and, indeed, why there were limits to loosening 
monetary policy when a recession called for such a policy. Indeed, to this author at least, the 
discussion in Neufeld (1958, p. 388) is entirely reminiscent of the position taken by the Bank of 
Japan when it argued that it could do nothing more to counter deflation in Japan in the mid 
1990s. The only difference is that, in Canada of the 1950s, the scourge was the fear of too much 
inflation.
16 
As is, hopefully, clear from the foregoing discussion, some of the criticisms leveled at the 
Bank of Canada stem from institutional factors as well as from how the Bank communicated 
policy actions. However, it is also crucial to recognize that there was heated debate over whether 
the stance of monetary policy was either sound, as the Bank of Canada would claim, or not 
sufficiently expansionary,  as the leading critics would contend. I later turn to the data to 
determine whether these can shed some light on the controversy.   
4.  The Spark to the Flame 
  Ostensibly, the unhappy relationship between the Bank of Canada’s Governor and 
Donald Fleming, then Finance Minister, erupted into a crisis following a unanimous decision by 
the directors of the Bank of Canada to increase Coyne’s pension from $12,000 to $25,000 on 
February 15, 1960. As noted by several observers, both the Governor’s salary of $50,000, and 
the pension, were several times greater than the remuneration received by members of 
Parliament or even the Prime Minister (e.g., see Shea 1961). Combined with statements made in 
earlier years about restraint, and the need for Canadians to live within their means (also see 
section 2 above), these events prompted a storm of criticism over the Governor’s behavior and 
his competence in the area of monetary policy. 
  The furor over Coyne’s salary and pension was just a spark to a growing controversy 
over the role and conduct of monetary policy over the previous years. Coyne would later make 
clear that the change in pension was only an excuse (MacEachern 1961). Never before, and 
perhaps never since, would a conflict between the Bank of Canada and the federal government 
                                                 
16 There were some economists (e.g., Knox 1959) who maintained the decades old line that inflation was a cyclical 
phenomenon, rising in booms, falling during a “depression” (op.cit., p. 9) and, therefore, nothing to worry about. As 
we have seen, others were worried that a permanent rise in inflationary tendencies was underway.   12
become so acrimonious. Indeed, the very issue of the core mandate of the central bank and the 
limits of its responsibilities, would come under full scrutiny. 
  As Figure 2 makes clear, interest rate levels in Canada were both higher and considerably 
more volatile than comparable U.S. interest rates. As noted subsequently by one observer 
(Jackson 1960): “The level of interest rates appeared to be at the heart of the controversy”. 
Beyond that, however, was that Coyne’s tenure marked a fundamental shift in the Bank’s role 
that was largely precipitated by the fact that he felt the need to communicate more forcefully the 
position and outlook of the Bank of Canada. In doing so, he brought to the fore the need for 
monetary and fiscal policies to move in harmony lest there be too much inflation or too little 
economic growth. Clearly, the government which attained a majority of seats in Parliament in 
1958, and the Finance Minister, Donald Fleming, saw Coyne’s approach as amounting to undue 
interference in the government’s economic policies. It is also important to point out that, 
throughout this episode, Coyne and Fleming corresponded frequently but never saw the need to 
meet face to face to discuss how monetary and fiscal policies ought to be coordinated. Nothing in 
the Bank of Canada Act compelled the Governor and the Government to consult with each other. 
However, under section 5(2) of the Act in place at the time (Aufricht 1967, p. 90), the Deputy 
Minister sat on the Bank’s Board as a non-voting member. As a result, the Minister of Finance 
and the Governor would end up talking, whether in public or in private, at cross-purposes, the 
former contradicting earlier positions in the name of political expediency, the latter seemingly 
trespassing in fields normally reserved for ministers announcing government policy. It is 
precisely the lack of clarity about where the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of monetary 
policy lies, together with the absence of mechanisms to permit the governor and the Minister of 
Finance to regularly discuss their views that created conditions which led to a crisis. Hence, 
whereas Coyne felt it was his duty to point out how government policies could impinge on the 
conduct of monetary policy one could question how much of his disagreement with the Minister 
of Finance should have been aired in public. Moreover, while it is natural for the Minister of 
Finance to seek advice from the governor regarding fiscal policy, in particular, and economic 
policy more generally, one can also second-guess Coyne’s decision eventually to go public with 
his proposals in 1961 to reduce unemployment.
17 Nevertheless, as far as the governor was 
                                                 
17 Matters came to a head when Coyne made public recommendations for sweeping tax and spending policy changes 
he had sent to Fleming in February 1961 (Canadian Press 1961). Previously, several individuals, who once   13
concerned, there was a growing unease over the government using the Bank of Canada as the 
scapegoat for the economic ills of the country as an election had just passed giving the 
Conservatives the largest majority in Canadian history.
18 In letters to Donald Fleming, in 1961, 
Coyne complained about what role monetary policy was to be able to play in the economic life 
of the nation, or, as he put it in one letter to Fleming (sent February 16, 1961), “put on the spot”. 
In the same letter, however, he goes on to label Canada’s economic problems as being of the 
structural variety and includes a memo entitled “The Requirements of Economic Policy Today” 
which represents a sweeping statement of the economic policies Coyne supports.
19 In this letter, 
Coyne underlines (literally) “The largest single factor in higher interest rates is the size of the 
Federal Government over-all cash deficit…, and the influence which this deficit or the prospect 
of this deficit has on the minds of investors.” (op.cit., p.3) It is only in subsequent 
correspondence (e.g., as in a letter to the Deputy Minister of Finance, Ken Taylor, sent June 2, 
1961) that Coyne is “…anxious that there should be no misunderstanding as to the relationship 
of monetary policy to this matter and the preparedness of the Bank of Canada, as in the past 
[emphasis added], to cooperate in support of the Government policy when it is decided.”
20 
Coyne’s ability to communicate policy to the public also contributed to raising the stakes in the 
battle over whether his policies represented the correct prescriptions. “The trouble with Mr. 
Coyne is that he has attempted to put his analysis in layman’s language. He had tried to 
‘communicate’.” (Moon 1960). This need not have been taken as a compliment since the same 
article points out that Coyne “… has hinted at some suggestions, though he does not ever come 
out and make some of these hints into firm suggestions, let alone recommendations, even for 
consideration.” It should be emphasized that the Governor did not communicate nearly as 
                                                                                                                                                             
supported Coyne, wrote of their dismay over Coyne’s attempts to influence government policies (e.g., see Cameron 
1960). It should be noted, however, that government policy had adopted a more nationalist tone, and one closer to 
some of the views expressed by Coyne himself, and was contemplating more active intervention in foreign exchange 
markets, a policy also favored by Coyne (Binhammer 1964, Yeager 1976, Siklos 2007).  
18 The elections of June 10, 1957 gave the Conservatives under John Diefenbaker a minority government. This was 
followed by a massive majority in the elections of 1958 and this, no doubt, gave the government the feeling that it 
could easily override the policies of the Bank of Canada, when and if this was to prove necessary. Of course, the 
Conservatives had to face an opposition that held the majority in the appointed body, the Senate, and this was to 
play a part in the undoing of the Conservatives at the end of the Coyne Affairs, as we shall see. 
19 The memo recommends actions in 15 areas including: (1) reduction of imports; (2) mobilisation of capital for 
investment; (9) minimize deficit finance; (10) national debt reduction; (12) an Unemployment Insurance Fund.  
20 The matter referred to in the quote concerned exchange rate policy. As noted earlier, Canada was to return to the 
Bretton Wood’s system shortly after Coyne’s successor, Louis Rasminsky, would take office. Muirhead (1999, p. 
169) describes Taylor as “…not a strong deputy minister, while Coyne was a determined man, confident of his 
abilities and about the direction in which he wished to take the Bank. That strength led to the governor injecting 
himself into what many considered to be the political process.”   14
frequently as modern-day central bankers do. Indeed, this may have been part of the problem 
(see below) since, between June 1957 and October 1959, Coyne did not give a single speech 
(Coyne 1961a). Subsequently, he gave 14 speeches in the 29 month period between November 
1959 and June 1961. Perhaps this explains why Coyne (1961a) later remarked: “The first 
intimation Mr. Fleming gave me of concern about my speeches was on March 8, 1961.”  
  As late as 1959, the Minister of Finance, Donald Fleming, asserted that the central bank, 
and not the government, was responsible for monetary policy. Gordon (1961) interprets the 
Government’s doctrine as follows: “…the government is responsible for fiscal and debt 
management policy but not for monetary policy. The Bank of Canada is autonomous in the 
formulation and implementation of monetary policy.” (op.cit., p.6) As pointed out later by 
Gordon (1961), this view served to “…confuse both the understanding of economic policy and 
the working of responsible government.” (op.cit., p. 9) The reason is that the Government failed 
to act to cushion the interest rate effects in the switch from the maturing World War II Victory 
bonds to the new long-term Conversion bonds.
21 
Although economists and other observers expect clarity, not just transparency, in central 
bank communications, one should also not lose sight of the reputation of Alan Greenspan who 
made lack of clarity, at times, a hallmark of his approach to communicating central bank 
policies. Two other features about the Coyne Affair are remarkable from the perspective of 
discussions in recent years over the place of the central bank. They are: the debate over the 
importance of accountability and transparency, the appropriate form of central bank governance, 
and the role played by economists’ views aired in public. 
  The version of the Bank of Canada Act at the time did not define the role of the 
government of the day in matters of monetary policy. Indeed, the governor had veto power over 
the Bank’s board although, in the event of a conflict, the Finance Minister was to be informed 
within a week. Cabinet could then support or disallow the veto.
22 As Muirhead (1999, p. 168) 
                                                 
21 Unlike ‘Operation Twist’ in the US, which was a deliberate attempt to manipulate the term structure in the early 
1960s, the Conversion Loan reflected a debt management problem. As with Operation Twist, there are differences of 
opinion in the academic literature about its success. Christofides, Helliwell, and Lester (1976) use the then existing 
Bank of Canada’s RDX2 model to conclude that long-term rates under the Conversion loan rose by about ½% while 
short-term rates were lower than they otherwise would have been. Others, including Pesando (1975), conclude that 
there were no lasting effects from the introduction of the Conversion loan. 
22 Section 14(1) of the Bank of Canada Act of 1953-54 (Aufricht 1967, p. 92) states: “The Governor, … has proven 
to veto any action or decision of the Board of Directors or of the Executive Committee, and if this veto power is 
exercised, the Governor or Deputy Governor, as the case may be, shall within seven days inform the Minister in 
writing … and the Governor in Council who may confirm or disallow the veto.”   15
points out the veto was in place because the Bank was originally a private institution and only 
subsequently did government become the sole shareholder. As a result, even though the 
legislation made the Governor the supreme decision-maker, they were subject to oversight by the 
Directors, who, by then, were appointed by the government. While the Directors might be under 
the impression that they were to act independently, or on their own initiative, clearly the 
government at the time saw things differently. Coyne’s public letter to Donald Fleming, shortly 
before he resigned on July 14, 1961, made it plain that there was a serious flaw in the governance 
of the central bank. “The Bank of Canada Act provides that the directors shall appoint the 
governor, with their choice being subject to approval by Government. Obviously, the directors 
are intended to exercise their own judgment in this matter, and take the initiative. On June 3, I 
asked the two directors who had come to Ottawa who they were going to appoint in my place, 
and the answer was, “We don’t know. We haven’t been told that yet” (Coyne 1961).  
  It is of crucial importance to remark that Minister of Finance, including Donald Fleming, 
paid lip service to the notion that day to day monetary policy decisions ought to rest with the 
central bank, while the overall policy environment should rest entirely with government. C.A. 
Dunning, Minister of Finance at the time the Bank of Canada was created in 1935, stated in 
1936: “In the long run, the bank, in the performance of a vital function, must be responsible to 
the sovereign will expressed through a government. There cannot be two sovereigns in a single 
state” (as quoted in Muirhead 1999, p. 169). Even Donald Fleming, at the centre of the Coyne 
affair, is quoted as supporting the views enunciated by one of his predecessors and, in so doing, 
was to become his own most eloquent critic. In 1961 Fleming stated: “The federal government 
has no power over the Bank of Canada and is not responsible for its actions” (as quoted in 
McArthur 1961). Five years earlier, in 1956, and then an opposition member, Fleming would be 
quoted as saying that: “The government cannot shed its responsibility for full fiscal policy in the 
broadest sense of the word and that must include the actions of the Bank of Canada” (as quoted 
in McArthur 1961). Coyne too understood the role of the Bank of Canada in economic affairs. 
“My own view is that the government must be supreme in all fields of economic policy, and 
must accept responsibility in such matters. The Bank of Canada has never set itself in opposition 
to the government. If there is any economic policy of the government which appears improper 
for the Bank of Canada, acting in its own sphere, to cooperate with, or if there is any monetary 
policy desired by the government which the governor of the bank could not in good conscience   16
carry out, I would regard it as the duty of the governor to resign, and I have previously said so” 
(as quoted in Canadian Press 1961). 
  It is tempting to think of this episode as one where the central bank acquiesced in the role 
of scapegoat while unfavorable economic outcomes could easily be blamed by the government 
as the fault of the Bank of Canada. However, such a view is entirely misplaced and not in 
keeping with what was said either in private or in public. First, the central bank not statutorily 
independent of government and, in public pronouncements, both sides recognized the reality that 
the ultimate responsibility for monetary policy was in the hands of the government.
23 Second, the 
various speeches Coyne made after 1958, together with the blunt language of the Annual 
Reports, all of which were widely reported on and discussed in the media, made it abundantly 
clear that the Bank of Canada would not allow itself to be treated as the scapegoat.
24  
  The upshot is that, at least in the public sphere, it became clearly understood that 
fundamental questions about the role of the central bank needed to be answered. In the aftermath 
of the Coyne Affair, the Government of the day would agree to form a Royal Commission, called 
the Porter Commission, which was to make recommendations about the relationship between the 
Government and the central bank. Coyne’s successor, Louis Rasminsky, echoing the plea made 
by his predecessor, would insist on the addition of a Directive into the Bank of Canada Act. The 
Directive would, ideally, incorporate the expectation that the Governor resign in the event of a 
policy disagreement with the Government. In the event, the Directive came into being in the 
1967 revision to the Bank of Canada Act, but the requirement to resign in case of a policy 
conflict did not. What was new was the principle of dual responsibility, namely that monetary 
policy objectives ought to be set by Government, while the day-to-day conduct of monetary 
policy is exclusively the responsibility of the central bank. The questions being posed over 45 
years ago are reminiscent of the debate, during the 1980s and 1990s, over the merits of central 
bank autonomy and discussions over the public posture of central banks. 
A second unprecedented feature of the Coyne Affair was the public involvement of 
academics in the debate over the conduct of monetary policy. This culminated with the 
publication of H. Scott Gordon’s (1961a) tirade against Coyne, and monetary policy more 
                                                 
23 The fact that the Conservative government had recently been returned to office with the largest majority in 
Canadian history also added to the government belief that it should ultimately be able to dictate the general course of 
monetary policy. 
24 See also Muirhead’s (1999, p. 179-82) brief account of the Coyne affair.   17
generally. However, much of the controversy appeared in the press. It began with a letter written 
by several economists (see Jackson 1960) calling for Coyne to resign which reached the Minister 
of Finance on June 8, 1960 although dissatisfaction with the governor’s performance began to 
surface earlier. The text of the letter (e.g., Jackson 1960) expressed how the economists were 
“…puzzled and distressed by the economic reasoning contained in these public statements.” (of 
the governor). The original letter, at least as published in the press, does not, however, stipulate 
the exact nature of what puzzled these economists. As pointed out, on the same day in another 
newspaper (Ottawa Citizen, December 8, 1960): “A distinguished pubic servant, who declined to 
be named, said the most noteworthy feature of the letter is that is suggests no cure for the 
conditions of which it complains, apart from Mr. Coyne’s dismissal.” At least as interpreted by 
the media; “The level of interest rates appeared to be at the heart of the controversy.” Others 
interpreted the core of the complaint to refer to a belief that “… the money supply should have 
been expanded months ago.” (Anderson 1960). 
As shown in Figure 6, there were two sharp drops in the money supply, the first at the 
end of 1957 which precipitated the recession of 1958, and the second, a far milder contraction in 
1959. The volatility of the narrow money supply at least may partly explain the comparable 
volatility though the Figure also reveals that the monetary base did not fluctuate as much. It is 
certainly feasible, therefore, that the proximate cause was a drop in money demand and not an 
excessive tightening, or a delay in loosening of policy, as some of Coyne’s critics claims (e.g., 
Gordon 1961), a possibility understood by some economists at least.
25 
The resulting furor over the over the letter, and Coyne’s actions in particular, did not, 
however, stem from some reasoned analysis. Rather, the economists who signed the letter were 
unhappy with the outcomes of the Bank of Canada’s monetary policies. Not surprisingly, not all 
observers agreed with the economists’ position. Coyne, in a letter to all the directors of the Bank, 
and Ken Taylor, the deputy-minister, includes a reference to a letter the governor received from 
W.A. Mackintosh, then Principal of Queen’s University who is said to have written to Coyne 
that: “After seeing the letter, I wanted to say that it was one of the most ill-mannered, ill-advised, 
and impertinent communications I ever saw. The letter to Coyne continues: “There has been 
                                                 
25 An unresolved issue us to what extent the sharp drop in the money supply was ‘manufactured’ by the Bank of 
Canada. The Bank’s 1957 Annual Report mentions the need to make adjustments to ensure comparability in the data 
but, instead of providing a clear statement of the problem, simply asserts the need to make changes in the data. The 
issue of the “shallow statistical trick” was raised by Gordon (1961), but is dismissed in Bellan (1961), and in the 
1958 Annual Report (Bank of Canada 1958).   18
need over the past few years of more measured analysis and criticism of both the Government 
and banking policies and the economists are at fault in not having supplied it, which they had 
every opportunity to do so.” 
The opportunity to criticize the Bank’s policies, and Coyne’s actions especially, would 
come from at least two sources, almost simultaneously. Ironically, one source was from Queen’s 
itself where Smith and Slater (1961), two well-known economists, called Coyne to task for errors 
of judgment. Specifically, they criticize Coyne for “overemphasizing inflation”. However, the 
authors are especially critical of Coyne’s worries over the consequences of (long-term) capital 
inflows and the need to consider some controls, as well as the connection between Coyne’s view 
of endemic structural economic problems and inflation. Almost four decades later, policymakers 
would again debate the merits of controlling capital flows in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 
1997-98. Previously, John Crow, a future governor, and the Bank of Canada would be accused of 
similar failings on the eve of the introduction of inflation targets (e.g., see Crow 2002, Laidler 
and Robson 1993).
26 
Whatever one’s views about the Smith and Slater arguments (also see section 3 above), 
they represent a coherent and reasoned set of ideas. The best known of Coyne’s critics, and the 
leader of the movement that produced the letter to Fleming, H. Scott Gordon, also produced a 
pamphlet outlining his views (Gordon 1961a). Although a variety of accusations were made 
against Coyne and the Bank, the two that are relevant to this paper include: an over-emphasis on 
fighting inflation, and stepping beyond the normal bounds for a central banker. The first criticism 
is one that was leveled by other critics but, as noted above, the government had no formal 
mechanism to override the Bank’s monetary policy strategy if it disagreed with it. All Gordon is 
able to show is that moderate inflation need not be incompatible with strong economic growth 
relying on data from 1896-1912 and 1945-1956. The latter period, of course, represents the post-
war boom which is hardly comparable to the economic situation of the late 1950s and much the 
                                                 
26 Unlike the Coyne Affair, the impetus for formal inflation targets came from government, not the Bank of Canada 
(Crow 2002, p. 174), and that any such policy change should be jointly agreed to (Crow 2002, p. 170). John Crow 
was not reappointed in 1993. According to Crow it was because of a fundamental disagreement over the future range 
of the inflation target range (Crow 2002, p. 201-9), though others view the failure to reappoint in more sinister terms 
as stemming from Crow’s public speeches in the lead-up to the fall election of 1993 which coincided with the end of 
his term as governor.   19
same can be said of the earlier period considered by Gordon. Of course, Gordon could hardly be 
accused of failing to anticipate the lessons of the stagflation of the 1970s and 1980s.
27 
A second accusation made by Gordon is that Coyne essentially overstepped his authority 
in matters of economic policy making. It was pointed out earlier that Fleming’s predecessors, 
and Coyne himself, understood the conditions under which a governor should resign in the event 
of a conflict over the strategy of monetary policy. However, in the absence of a formal 
mechanism to resolve such conflicts, the resulting vacuum precipitated the crisis. As a trenchant 
review of Gordon’s analysis remarks: “If Mr. Coyne is now free to set his own policies, it can 
only be because the present Minister of Finance, Mr. Fleming, allows him that freedom” (Bellan 
1961).  
Only after this letter had been publicized, and attempts to identify the source of the 
economists’ complaints been identified, did a full economic analysis of the situation take place. 
The financial press (e.g., Deacon 1960) focused on the relatively high volatility of Canadian 
versus U.S. short-term interest rates, but the main culprit of the difficulties the academics, and 
others, had with Bank of Canada policies was the failure to provide the proper signals to 
financial markets once the bank rate began to float in 1956, thus abandoning the system, still in 
place in the U.S. at the time, of fixing the discount rate and changing it when the central bank 
wants to signal tightening or loosening of policies. Over and over again the reaction, as gauged 
by the financial press, was “… there could be more frank comment by the central bank on its 
actions.” As a result some of the critics claimed: “The Bank of Canada, it is claimed, should give 
better signals of the better direction of its money management programs” (both as quoted in 
Deacon 1960). These comments are nothing new to the experience of central banks in more 
recent times since they revolve around the notions of transparency and predictability. 
The Coyne Affair ended quickly. Hence, we can be brief. The Conservative government 
introduced a bill consisting of a single sentence on 23 June 1961 that read: “The office of the 
Governor of the Bank of Canada shall be deemed to be vacant immediately on the coming into 
force of this Act.” The bill was passed quickly by the Conservatives but the Senate, where the 
Liberals held a majority, supported the Governor’s position. Coyne’s position was helped when 
                                                 
27 Despite arguing that inflation and solid economic performance can go hand in hand Gordon also admits “it is still 
a matter of vigorous debate among economists how effective monetary policy can be against large economic 
problems and especially against recession and unemployment” (Gordon 1961a, p. 35). This is hardly a convincing 
indictment of Bank of Canada’s policies, or a ringing endorsement of the strength of Gordon’s own position.   20
it was revealed that at least two of the Bank’s directors were politically influenced and that the 
Minister was less than truthful in recollecting events surrounding the pension issue. The Senate 
failed to give ascent to the government’s bill, concluding that the Governor’s actions did not 
violate the Bank of Canada Act, thereby permitting Coyne to resign on July 12, 1961, “… 
honorably, and to hold up my head among my fellow citizens …” (Coyne 1961). 
5.   Empirical Evidence  
  It is, of course, a hazardous task to apply modern-day techniques and concepts to revisit 
policy debates that took place decades ago. Nevertheless, as the previous sections hopefully 
made clear, the controversy that eventually engulfed the Governor of the Bank of Canada 
revolved around issues that would be replayed at different times, and across many countries, 
namely whether the stance of monetary policy is appropriate under the circumstances. In this 
connection, it is important to consider that, even nowadays, if hindsight favors one view over 
another, this is only because researchers likely have the data that has been subsequently revised, 
sometimes significantly so. This is one of the lessons of Orphanides (2001) who revisits the 
Fed’s policies during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, as we have seen, this is especially 
important in revisiting policies that eventually culminated in the Coyne Affair.  
  Another area of contention is likely to revolve around whether any central bank during 
the 1950s could be forward-looking as opposed to reacting solely to past events. Whereas central 
banks today are almost certainly forward-looking, the evidence presented in the previous 
sections paint a somewhat different picture. In particular, while there is some evidence the Bank 
of Canada was aiming to think ahead when deciding whether or not to tighten or to loosen 
policy, there was a strong element of backward-looking thinking going on as well.  This should 
not be a surprise, or even disturbing, to the modern eye. After all, it must be recalled that the 
operations of the Bank of Canada had undergone a profound transformation in the early 1950s, 
namely the move to a floating exchange rates and the adoption of the interest rate benchmark that 
would henceforth serve as the mechanism to evaluate the stance of monetary policy. 
  In what follows then, the empirical evidence assumes that the central bank potentially 
reacted to inflation and to overall economic developments. Although the Taylor rule device is   21
used to assess the Bank of Canada’s policies this only serves as a vehicle to translate the Banks’ 
thinking during the period 1952-1961.
28   
  A standard Taylor rule is written as follows: 
  1 tt y t t t ii y i v π γ πγ ρ − =+ + + +    (1) 
where it is the nominal interest rate instrument of monetary policy,  [( 1 )] i ρ α = −  is the sum of 
the steady-state real interest rate and the annual inflation rate, π   and  y   are, respectively, 
inflation and the output gap, ρ  is the interest rate persistence or smoothing parameter, and  t v  is 
a residual term.
29 Similarly, the output gap is the percent deviation of real GNP from its potential 
level. The coefficients  [ (1 ) ] π γ ρβ =−    and  [( 1 ) ] y γ ρθ = −   reflect the weights policy makers place 
on inflation versus the output gap, while the central bank’s reaction to output versus inflation is 
captured via estimates of β , and θ , respectively, the steady state responses of interest rates to 
inflation and the output gap. If contemporaneous inflation and output are unobserved but respond 
to the past history of these variables and, in turn, influence their expected values, they are 
endogenously determined. The coefficients in the reaction function are obtained from an 
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where 
T
t i  is the interest rate target,  ( ) tt i E π +   , and  ( ) tt k Ey +   are the conditional expectations of  
inflation and the output gap, i and k periods ahead (i,k≥0). Since  ( ) tt i E π +   , and  ( ) tt k Ey +   are 
unobservable, instruments can serve as proxies. Good proxies are generally difficult to find and 
the difficulty is likely to be even more acute in the present context. However, given the earlier 
discussion concerning the role of monetary aggregates, US economic developments, and the 
behaviour of the current account, it is of considerable interest to ask whether these might have 
                                                 
28 Originally, I had planned on estimating a small structural model of the kind that academics during the 1950s used 
in debating monetary policy issues. This proved impossible for several reasons. First, models at the time were 
generally not estimated so there is no empirical basis for comparison. Second, there were essentially no attempts to 
hypothesize the anticipated size of coefficients, and predictions from such models were largely based on “best 
guesses” about which forces were relatively most important. I also considered the possibility of examining a 
counterfactual experiment whereby the exchange rate would be assumed fixed. However, as Figure 3 makes plain, 
except at the very end of Coyne’s tenure, exchange rate fluctuations were very small. Also, see Siklos (2007). 
29 If there were an explicit, or even implicit target for inflation, then π   would represent the deviation from such an 
objective. Other than the desideratum of “low” inflation, there is nothing to suggest that policy makers, or even 
academics, of the 1950s had any numerical target in mind. We return to this question below.   22
serves as relevant instruments. This is the econometric equivalent of asking whether the Bank of 
Canada effectively took such data into consideration when helping guide interest rate 
movements. 
  Previously, it was also argued that monetary policy in Canada could not be easily 
distinguished from U.S. developments. Therefore, it seems equally useful to examine a version 
of (1) that captures Canada’s monetary policy relative to that of the U.S. Define 
* i , 
* ~ π , and 
* y   
as the differential between Canada’s (C) interest rate, inflation rate, and output gap, relative to 
their counterpart for the US (US). As a result 
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Next, following Mark (2005), I estimate a version of the Taylor rule where the policy instrument 
is 
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Equation (6) is simply a conventional Taylor rule expressed in differences between Canada and 
the U.S.
30 
  I rely not only in the available historical data published subsequently – I will refer to this 
as the quasi-final data – but also on ‘real time’ data. The latter were constructed by collecting 
quarterly Gross National Product data from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics for several 
vintages beginning in 1953 through 1963.
31 An appendix provides additional details. The quasi-
final data, based on a 1972 vintage of data, are from Cayen and van Norden (2005) who made 
available their GNP time series that also begin in 1952.
32 Data for interest rates and prices are 
final, not real time data while US data are quasi-final data and real time observations. The 
relevant interest rate, CPI, and GNP data were collected from the Banking and Monetary 
                                                 
30 As Mark (2005) points out, equation (6) is obtained by assuming homogeneity in cross-country coefficients for 
expected inflation and the output gap. We also estimated versions of (2) and (6) with a nominal exchange rate term, 
but our conclusions are unchanged. It would have been preferable to add a terms of trade measure. However, I was 
unable to construct a consistent quarterly series for the 1950s. 
31 A total of 21 vintages were collected, one for the second and fourth quarters of each year beginning with 1953Q4 
and ending with 1963Q4. 
32 Berlinguette (1954) provides a detailed account of the problems surrounding the construction of aggregate output 
data during the 1950s in Canada.   23
Statistics publication of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System.
33 Vintage 
US data were collected from various issues of the Survey of Current Business. One difficulty 
with both Canadian and US data is the absence of quarterly constant dollar GNP data during the 
1950s in real-time. For Canadian data, a real GNP figure was constructed using a proxy for the 
implicit price deflator calculated from the data used in Cayen and van Norden (2005). For the 
US, the implicit price deflator was estimated from real GNP estimates in Balke and Gordon 
(1989). The deflator for both countries is not real time data. For the quasi-final data I was able to 
use available real GNP estimates for both countries. Finally, I also tried but was unsuccessful, in 
creating a real time data set for different definitions of the money supply. Instead, I rely on the 
monetary base from CANSIM II (series v37145), as well as the monetary base, M1, and M2 
series from Metcalfe, Redish and Shearer (1998) whose data are available from 
www.econ.ubc.ca/redish/research.htm.
34 Their monthly data were converted into the quarterly 
frequency via simple averaging. US money stock data are from Balke and Gordon (1989).  
  I now turn to more formal evidence to examine the behaviour of the Bank of Canada. A 
simple AR(1) model of inflation for the US and Canada produces virtually identical estimates of 
the persistence parameters with an estimate of 0.66 for Canada, and 0.68 for the US (both are 
statistically significant at the 1% level). To place these estimates into some perspective, these are 
lower than estimates obtained for the period of high inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, but are 
higher than estimates that have been reported for the low and stable inflation rates since the 
1990s (e.g., see Siklos 1999, Burdekin and Siklos 1999). In contrast, the 90 day Treasury bill 
yield for Canada displays a considerable amount of persistence (0.84), again based on the same 
AR(1) model, as well as considerable explanatory power (adj R
2  =  0.72). Although AR(1) 
models are simple, they shed light on the process driving inflation and interest rates. Hence, 
while nominal interest rates may have been volatile during the 1950s, they were predictable.
35  
  Turning to estimates of a Taylor type rule, Figure 7 summarizes estimates of the steady 
state parameters for the output gap (θ  in equation (2)) and the real interest rate (α  in equation 
(2)), using the Taylor rule written as in equation (1). Coefficients are estimated via OLS for 10 
                                                 
33 As several studies have shown (e.g., see Cayen and van Norden 2005), revisions to CPI and interest rate data are 
minor. 
34 Data obtained from the Bank of Canada Archives (Freeman 1959) match very nearly the data for the same period 
presented By Metcalfe, Redish and Shearer (1998). 
35 Estimates of persistence in Canadian and US inflation rates are based on the sample 1952Q1-1962Q4, and for the  
nominal interest rate the sample is 1953Q1-1962Q4.   24
vintages beginning with the 1954Q4 vintage, which yields 23 observations, up to the 1963Q4 
vintage, which yields 44 observations. The inflation parameter, whether estimated 
contemporaneously or with a one period lag, was never statistically significant. Instead, the 
highest p-value recorded for  π γ   in equation (1) was 0.20. By contrast, the coefficients for the 
output gap and the constant (i , and  y γ   in equation (1)) were always highly significant at 10% 
levels or less, except for the 1957Q4 and 1959Q4 vintages.  
  The box plots given the median estimates for the two parameters described above, while 
the boxed area represents the third (top) and first (bottom) quartiles, respectively. The shaded 
area is a 95% confidence interval for the median. As the shaded and boxed areas do not overlap 
this implies that most estimates of the response of the Treasury bill rate to the output gap are 
statistically significantly different from the median. In particular, the Bank of Canada appears to 
have responded especially vigorously to the output gap in vintages 1957Q4 and 1959Q4, 
precisely at critical junctures in the Coyne controversy. The fact that these steady state 
coefficients are statistically insignificant suggests that they are very imprecisely estimated. 
Nevertheless, the mere fact that the version of the instrument rule behaves as shown in Figure 7, 
relative to all the other vintages, implies that monetary policy reacted differently at those crucial 
moments. Turning to estimates of the steady state real interest rate, the sheer volatility of the real 
interest rate is glaringly apparent. Indeed, the estimated real interest rate for the 1959Q4 vintage 
is an outlier at 11%. Moreover, the median response at over 4% exceeds the third quartile so that, 
on balance, the Bank’s monetary policy appears to have been exceedingly tight on a couple of 
occasions. Otherwise, the bulk of the distribution is well within historical estimates of the long-
run real interest rate. Whether these transitory, but sharp, monetary policy responses are the 
spark that led to the events of 1959-60 is unclear, but at least the data give some hints at what 
may have produced the conflict that eventually led to James Coyne’s departure from the Bank of 
Canada. 
Next, I turn to estimates of the coefficients in the Taylor rule based on (6), where 
differences between US and Canadian series are based on real time data for both countries.
36 
Figure 8 plots the range of parameter estimates where i=0,2. The results indicate that the degree 
                                                 
36 Matching US and Canadian data in real time is difficult as the precise release dating of National Accounts data is 
unclear after the first two vintages. For US data we took, for example, the November release to be the fourth quarter 
vintage. The first quarter vintage is taken to be the February release; the second quarter vintage is the May release, 
while the third quarter vintage is the August release.   25
of interest rate smoothing was significantly reduced between 1958 and 1960. The resulting 
fluctuations in nominal interest rates are precisely the ones that observers complained about 
when assessing monetary policy performance in Canada. Mean estimates of the steady-state real 
interest rate also vary considerably across the 9 vintages examined. However, median estimates 
do not change much. Nevertheless, it is clear that real interest rates were high in the late 1950s 
relative to almost every later vintage. Turning to the inflation response, it is found that most 
estimates are imprecise with the shaded area, indicating the 95% confidence interval around the 
median, overlapping the zero response value. Yet, it is interesting to note that steady-state 
responses are near or exceed 1 until the 1959Q4 vintage, that is, consistent with the Taylor 
principle. Thereafter, the mean responses are well below one. Note also that there are outlier 
responses for some of the reaction function estimates. Hence, on this basis, one cannot exclude 
the possibility that the Bank of Canada’s reaction to inflation may have been excessive until 
1960Q2, at least relative to US monetary policy and precisely until the quarter when Coyne 
resigns. The coefficients are either insignificant, especially until 1959Q4, indicating the Bank of 
Canada did not consider output gap developments, or they are imprecisely measured beginning 
with the 1960Q2 vintage. 
Perhaps if the equilibrium interest rate was high, it is because the central bank’s implicit 
target for inflation was low. To investigate this possibility, I adopt the approach of Kozicki and 
Tinsley (2005) to derive an implicit inflation target. Starting from equation (6), and setting i=0, 1 
combine it with a dynamic adjustment of the interest rate modelled as (also see Judd and 
Rudebusch 1998)  
** * *
01 0 1 1 (1 ) tt t t ii i v ββ δ β −− =Δ+− + +     (7) 
where 
* δ is the equilibrium real interest rate, and all other terms were previously defined. Next, 
combining (6) and (7) gives  
** * * * * *
12 3 415 ([ ] ) tt t t t t t t iy i i i v ττ πτ τ τ π − =+ + +Δ+ −− +   (8) 
Equation (8) is estimated vial OLS and GMM (with the same instrument sets as before; 
also see notes to Figure 2) for 9 separate vintages, while the expression for the central bank’s 
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Table 1 provides the results. It is clear that, other than for the earlier vintages when the 
Canada-US inflation differential target was small or statistically insignificant, the Bank is seen as 
permitting a slight upwards drift in the inflation differential. Therefore, it does not appear that 
the Bank was more averse to inflation than its US counterpart.  
The empirical evidence presented here is suggestive of the possible overreaction of the 
Bank of Canada to inflationary developments. Whether the estimates are conclusive is another 
matter, as the combined narrative and econometric evidence is not entirely clear concerning the 
extent to which the Governor, in particular, wanted to pre-empt or eliminate inflationary 
pressures in the Canadian economy. Therefore, paraphrasing the wonderful expression used in 
Scottish Courts for the situation where the prosecution did not provide sufficient evidence of 
guilt, but where there are considerable doubts about the offender’s innocence, the verdict on the 
Coyne Affair is ‘not proven’.   
6.   Conclusions  
  As we have seen, the Coyne Affair focused policy makers’ minds on clarifying the limits 
of the responsibility of the Governor in dictating the adoption of a particular monetary policy 
strategy. To be sure, the evidence presented in this paper cannot, without a shadow of a doubt, 
exclude the possibility that an inadequate understanding of macro policy during the 1950s played 
a role in this episode. Nevertheless, the ‘real-time’ data, together with the econometric evidence, 
does not support this view. Instead, it was primarily institutional failure combined with, at times, 
an overt ideology strongly biased toward the maintenance of price stability at all times, that 
contributed to the events of 1958-1961.
37   
  Shortly after Louis Rasminsky took office as Governor, Canada rejoined the Bretton 
Woods system. Monetary independence was then effectively lost for over a decade until Canada 
once again returned to a flexible exchange rate system. In such an environment conflict between 
the government and the central bank was less likely. However, a conflict of sorts re-emerged 
once Canada adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s. The ensuing dispute between John 
Crow and the incoming Finance Minister, Paul Martin, did not produce the same drama that 
marks the Coyne Affair in Canadian economic history. A significant part of the explanation has 
to do with the relative clarity of the present Bank of Canada Act concerning the responsibility of 
                                                 
37 Another contributing factor may have been the absence of a committee decision-making structure for monetary 
policy, unlike the US’s FOMC. An exploration of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.   27
the government over matters of monetary policy strategy. Another explanation was an 
understanding, only emerging at the time and requiring some fine-tuning, about the crucial role 
played by a central bank’s communications strategy. These are some of the most important 
lessons learned in Canada from the Coyne Affair, and ones that have implications for central 
banks around the world. While the lessons learned are perhaps old ones, and repeated in different 
parts of the world at different times, they bear repeating for the failure to heed them can have 
disastrous implications for both the central bank and the government in office.  
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Note: Inflation in Canada is 100 times (logPt – log Pt-4). Data are quarterly from CANSIM. 
Unemployment data are from Historical Statistics of Canada (Statistics Canada, 11-516-XIE). 
US data are from FREDII, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and Survey of Current Business 
(various issues). The shaded areas represent US recessions as measured by the NBER’s business 
cycle chronology available at www.nber.org.   29









































Sources: Bank of Canada, and Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve.   30
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Note: Data are from Bank of Canada, and Bank of Canada Archives. 
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Note: Data are from Cayen and van Norden (2005). RT is real time data collected in 1972; FN is 
final data based on data collected from CANSIM. BQ (Blanchard-Quah), LT (linear trend), HP 
(Hodrick-Prescott; smoothing parameter = 1600), QT (quadratic trend) are the filters used to 
estimate potential output. The output gap is 
P
t t y y −  where  t y  is actual log real GNP and 
P
t y  is 
the estimate of potential output.   32
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Note:  Data are for the 1957Q4 and 1960Q2 vintages. See the appendix for an explanation. LDT 
means linear detrending, LQDT means quadratic detrending, OUTGAP means the output gap is 
estimated using an H-P filter (smoothing parameter = 1600).  33





































Note: Data are from CANSIM, and Metcalfe, Redish, and Shearer (1998). The shaded areas 
highlight episodes of possibly sharp reductions in the money supply. See the text for the details. 
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Note:  The top figure give the range of estimates for α (see equation (1) and (2)) while the 
bottom figure gives the range of estimates for θ  (again, see equation (1)). The box plot and 
shaded areas are explained in the text.  35



















































































































































Note: Coefficient estimates are estimated via GMM. 
*
ti π + , 
*
tj y +   indicates the value of i, j combinations used in estimation. The standard set of instruments consists of a constant, 
2 lags in the Treasury bill yield differential, 2 lags in the output gap differential, and 2 lags in the inflation differential. The extended set of instruments consists of the standard set 
augmented by 2 lag in the long-term interest rate differential, 1 lag in the differential money base growth rate, and 1 lag in the current account to GNP ratio.    36





Test statistic  GMM estimates 
(%) 
Test statistic 
1957Q4  0.25 (.01)  6.15  0.04  0.06 (.80) 
1958Q2  0.33 (.01)  6.21  0.17  2.44 (.12) 
1958Q4  0.39 (.00)  10.01  0.32  2.74 (.10) 
1959Q2  0.42 (.00)  15.80  0.65  18.94 (.00) 
1959Q4  0.44 (.00)  10.81  0.39  13.57 (.00) 
1960Q2  0.58 (.00)  12.12  0.44  21.09 (.00) 
1960Q4  0.57 (.00)  14.12  0.46  17.26 (.00) 
1961Q2  0.60 (.00)  15.86  0.50  16.98 (.00) 
1961Q4  0.63 (.00)  17.49  0.37  21.17 (.00) 
 
Note: Estimates of equation (9). The test statistic is distributed as a 
2 χ  with the p-value given in 
parenthesis. A positive number indicates that notional Canadian inflation is higher than US 
inflation.   37
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Appendix: Canadian Real Time Data, 1953-1969 
 
Data were collected from the National Accounts Income and Expenditures (NAIE) of the 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics (later renamed Statistics Canada). Beginning with the 1958Q3 
issue, this publication was given the catalogue number 13-001. Some of the issues show an 
actual print date (e.g., 23-10-1953, that is, October 23, 1953) in the case of the issue for the first 
and second quarters of 1953. After 1954, the publication date is unclear. In all cases it was 
assumed that the data would have been made immediately available to the Bank of Canada to be 
used in the quarter following publication. Hence, a vintage dated 1953Q4 refers to data collected 
from the 1953Q3 edition of the NAIE. A total of 33 vintages of data were collected every two 
quarters beginning with the 1953Q4 edition of the NAIE. Although some observations go back 
to 1947, the earliest recorded figure used in the paper is for 1952Q1 in order to retain consistency 
throughout the vintages (subsequent issues of the NAIE only published data back to 1952Q1). 
Vintages of Gross National Expenditures at Market Prices (Table number changes across issues 
of the same publication) and were deflated by a quasi-final estimate of the implicit price index 
obtained from Cayen and van Norden (2005). 